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1Abstract
The evolution and maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies chal-
lenges various disciplines ranging from evolutionary biology, to anthropology, social
sciences and economics. In social interactions, cooperators increase the welfare of
the group at some cost to themselves whereas defectors attempt to free-ride and nei-
ther provide beneﬁts nor incur costs. The problem of cooperation becomes even more
pronounced when increasing the number of interacting individuals. Punishment and
voluntary participation have been identiﬁed as possible factors to support cooperation
and prevent cheating. Typically, punishment behavior is unable to gain a foothold in
a population, while volunteering alone can efﬁciently prevent deadlocks in states of
mutual defection but is unable to stabilize cooperation. The combined effects of the
two mechanisms have surprisingly different consequences in ﬁnite and inﬁnite popu-
lations. Here we provide a detailed comparison of the two scenarios and demonstrate
that driven by the inherent stochasticity of ﬁnite populations, the possibility to abstain
from social interactions plays a pivotal role, which paves the way for the establishment
of cooperation and punishment.
21 Introduction
Cooperation is a recurrent theme in nature ranging from microbial colonies to human societies
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981, Colman, 1995, Dugatkin, 1997, Nowak, 2006b, Trivers, 1971).
Yet, the evolution of cooperative behavior that produces beneﬁts to others at some cost to self is
far from obvious under Darwinian selection. In fact, defectors that avoid the costs and produce
no beneﬁts are better off, while cooperators are doomed and bound to disappear. In evolutionary
game theory such scenarios are captured by public goods games (Hardin, 1968, Kagel & Roth,
1995) where cooperators invest into a common good while defectors attempt to exploit the
resource without contributing to it. However, if everybody defects they forego the public good:
everybody would be better off had they cooperated. This describes a classical conﬂict of interest
between the individual and the community arising in social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980, Hauert
et al., 2006). The evolution and maintenance of cooperation in large groups of interacting
individuals poses a challenging problem in evolutionary biology as well as in studies of human
interactions (Boyd & Richerson, 1988, Hauert & Schuster, 1997).
It is well known that cooperation in public good situations requires positive or negative in-
centives discriminatingly directed at individual players (Olson, 1965). In particular, so called
punishment directed by some of the players against cheaters in their group has proved to
stabilise cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004, Yamagishi, 1986). Such retaliatory peer-
punishment can be viewed as a form of (direct or indirect) reciprocation. Clearly, defectors
cannot invade a population of punishers (Boyd et al., 2003, Boyd & Richerson, 1992, Sigmund
et al., 2001). But how can punishers establish themselves in a population of defectors? The
emergence of punishing behaviour is viewed as a challenging problem. Interestingly, it can be
resolved if participation in the public good interaction is optional rather than compulsory.
Voluntary participation means the game is extended from cooperators and defectors to in-
clude a third strategic type, the loners (Hauert et al., 2002b). Participating in public enterprises
bears considerable risks because whether and how many participants turn out to be defectors
3is not known in advance. Loners are risk averse individuals that refuse to participate and, in-
stead, rely on ﬁxed autarkic resources. Recently, the combination of costly punishment and
volunteering has led to some controversial results in inﬁnite populations (Brandt et al., 2006,
Fowler, 2005) but the issue has largely been resolved for the dynamics in ﬁnite populations and
has revealed new insights relevant for real populations (Boyd & Mathew, 2007, Hauert et al.,
2007). Here we provide a detailed analysis and comparison of the two different approaches.
2 Model & Methods
In order to model punishing and abstaining in public goods games we follow Fowler (2005) and
Brandt et al. (2006) and consider the dynamics of four strategic types: the cooperators x, the
defectors y, the loners z and the punishers w. In inﬁnite populations (see section 2.1) x;y;z;w
refer to the fraction of the population adopting the respective strategy (x + y + z + w = 1),
whereas in ﬁnite populations (see section 2.2) of size M the capital letters X;Y;Z;W refer
to the number of individuals adopting the respective strategy (X + Y + Z + W = M). A
group of N individuals is randomly sampled from the population: cooperators, defectors and
punishers participate in the public goods interaction, whereas the loners rely on a small but
ﬁxed payoff . Loners are not secluded but, for example, collect mushrooms instead of joining
a hunting party. Cooperators and punishers invest a ﬁxed amount c into the common good. The
total investments into the common pool are then multiplied by a factor r and equally divided
among all participants, irrespective of their contributions but excluding the loners. Thus, the
common resource yields a net beneﬁt of BS = rc(nx +nw)=S to defectors as well as BS  c to
cooperators and punishers, where ni indicates the number of participants of type i in the sample
and S = nx+ny+nw  N denotes the effective number of participants, which varies based on
the number of loners in the sample. If S = 1, the sole participant is forced to act as a loner and
receives . Furthermore, punishers impose a ﬁne  onto defectors at a cost  with  >  and,
in addition, they also may punish cooperators because of their negligence and failure to punish
4defectors (if there were any) but the ﬁnes and costs of punishment are reduced to  and 
with 0    1. In this context, cooperators are often termed second order free-riders because
they avoid the costs of punishment. The loners payoff is assumed to satisfy (r   1)c >  > 0
such that loners are better off than groups of defectors (which score zero) but worse off than
groups of contributors (mixtures of cooperators and punishers) obtaining (r   1)c.
2.1 The Replicator Equation
The evolutionary process in inﬁnite populations is traditionally studied using replicator dynam-
ics (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998, Nowak & Sigmund, 2004, Taylor & Jonker, 1978). The state
of the population is determined by the frequencies of the different types with x+y+z+w = 1,
which conﬁnes the state space to the simplex S4. Individuals interact in groups of size N that are
randomly formed according to multinomial sampling. Under replicator dynamics, every strat-
egy that performs better than the population on average increases in abundance: _ x = x(Px   P)
etc. where Pi denotes the average payoff of strategy i and  P = xPx + yPy + zPz + wPw
represents the average population payoff.
According to Brandt et al. (2006), which follows the approach in Hauert et al. (2002a), the
average payoffs for each strategy are given by
Px = zN 1 +B   F(z)c  w(N   1)G(y) (1a)
Py = zN 1 +B  w(N   1) (1b)
Pz =  (1c)
Pw = zN 1 +B   F(z)c  y(N   1)   x(N   1)G(y) (1d)
| {z } | {z } | {z }
loner payoff public goods interaction punishment
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B = rc
x + w
1   z

1  
1   zN
N(1   z)

F(z) = 1 + z
N 1(r   1)  
r
N
1   zN
1   z
G(y) = 1   (1   y)
N 2:
Here B denotes the average beneﬁt returned by the public good, F(z) indicates the effective
costs of contributing to the public good and G(y) speciﬁes the probability that the failure of
cooperators to punish defectors is recognized by punishers. This occurs whenever a group
consists of at least one cooperator, one defector and one punisher. Note that F(z) depends on
the abundance of loners because they determine the number of participants in the public goods
interaction and thus the effective group size S. The resulting effective costs of cooperation are
given by (1 r=S)c because the fraction r=S of the investment is returned to the investor. Thus,
if loners abound the typical group size is small and cooperation becomes dominant whenever
r > S, i.e. if cooperative investments have a positive net return (Hauert et al., 2002a, 2006).
However, if S = 1, which happens with probability zN 1, no interaction partners are found and
the single participant gets the loner’s payoff . We assume that r < N such that defection is
the dominant solution in the absence of loners and punishers.
The dynamics of this system is bi-stable and the evolutionary outcome depends on the ini-
tial conﬁguration of the population: either punishers disappear, which gives rise to endless
oscillations of cooperators, defectors and loners (Hauert et al., 2002b), or a neutral mixture of
cooperators and punishers establishes. In addition, the dynamics is structurally unstable, and
hence cannot be relied upon to yield robust predictions. Thus, the analysis of the replicator
dynamics is insufﬁcient to draw ﬁnal conclusions about the relative merits of volunteering and
punishment. For a full analysis, we refer to Brandt et al. (2006) and use this scenario as a
reference point for the following discussion of the dynamics in ﬁnite populations.
62.2 The Moran Process
In ﬁnite populations, the Moran process (Moran, 1962) captures the evolutionary dynamics in
three elementary steps: birth, death and replacement. An individual is randomly selected for
reproduction with a probability proportional to its payoff or ﬁtness and produces a clonal off-
spring. Then, a randomly chosen individual (independent of ﬁtness) is eliminated and replaced
by the offspring. Thus, individuals with a higher ﬁtness have better chances to reproduce but
they can still be eliminated due to random drift. The overall population size is kept constant.
Based on this process, the ﬁxation probability of a single mutant in a homogeneous resident
population can be determined, i.e. the probability that eventually the entire population adopts
the mutant strategy. Traditionally, the Moran process is considered for constant ﬁtness values
assigned to residents and mutants. Only recently this approach was extended to include fre-
quency dependent ﬁtness (Nowak, 2006a, Nowak et al., 2004). In this framework, the ﬁtness of
an individual consists of two components 1 s+sP: a static baseline ﬁtness, which is normal-
ized to one, and a dynamic component P, which depends on interactions with other members
of the population. The selection strength s determines the relative contribution of the frequency
dependent component to the overall ﬁtness, i.e. s measures the importance of the game for
overall success.
In the present context, the Moran process can be equivalently interpreted as an imitation
process where a randomly selected individual adopts the strategy of a random member of the
population, which is chosen with a probability proportional its ﬁtness. In this case mutations
do not refer to genetic changes but rather to random experimenting with different behavioral
patterns.
Previous studies (Imhof et al., 2005, Nowak et al., 2004, Taylor et al., 2004, Traulsen et al.,
2005) considered pairwise interactions among two or three strategic types. In the present case,
new challenges arise because of the arbitrary interaction group size N: when sampling the
interaction group, drawing one member affects the probabilities to select each strategic type in
7subsequentdrawsoftheremainingmembers. InapopulationofsizeM = X+Y +Z+W where
X;Y;Z and W refer to the number of cooperators, defectors, loners and punishers, respectively,
the group formation process is given by a multivariate hypergeometric distribution such that the
probability to interact in a group of nx cooperators, ny defectors, nz loners and nw punishers
with nx + ny + nz + nw = N (nx + ny + nw = S) becomes
H(X;nx;Y;ny;Z;nz;W;nw) =
  x
nx
  y
ny
  z
nz
  w
nw

 M
N
 : (2)
Using Eq. (2) the average effective interaction group size S and its composition can be derived,
to obtain the following average payoffs in ﬁnite populations:
PX = (
Z
N 1)
(
M 1
N 1) +B   F(Z)c   W
M 1(N   1)G(Y ) (3a)
PY = (
Z
N 1)
(
M 1
N 1) +B   W
M 1(N   1) (3b)
PZ =  (3c)
PW = (
Z
N 1)
(
M 1
N 1) +B   F(Z)c   Y
M 1(N   1)   X
M 1(N   1)G(Y ) (3d)
| {z } | {z } | {z }
loner payoff public goods interaction punishment
with
B = rc
X + W
M   Z   1
 
1  
1
N(M   Z)
 
M   (Z   N + 1)
  Z
N 1

 M 1
N 1

!!
F(Z) = 1  
r
N
M   N
M   Z   1
+
  Z
N 1

 M 1
N 1


r
N
Z + 1
M   Z   1
+ r
M   Z   2
M   Z   1
  1

G(Y ) = 1  
M   1
M   Y   1
 M Y  1
N 1

 M 1
N 1

In analogy to Eq. (1), B denotes the average return from the public good to defectors and F(Z)
indicates the payoff difference between contributors (cooperators and punishers) and defectors
before punishment. As before, G(Y ) is the probability that the second order free-riders (co-
operators) are found out and punished for their negligence. If S = 1, which happens with
probability
  Z
N 1

=
 M 1
N 1

, the single participant gets the loner payoff . In the limit M ! 1,
Eq. (3) recovers Eq. (1) when converting strategy numbers into fractions using X ! xM, etc.
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  1=M2 (Fudenberg et al., 2006, Imhof et al., 2005). In this limit, the population generally
consists of a single type (in each generation M mutants are produced and, typically, it takes
less than M generations for a successful mutant to reach ﬁxation). Occasionally a mutant
appears and either disappears again or takes over the entire population before the next mutant
appears. This restricts the evolutionary process to the edges of the simplex S4 where at most two
strategic types are present at any one point in time. For this setting we derive the probabilities
to ﬁnd the system in either one of the four homogenous states with all cooperators, defectors,
loners or punishers. This determines the relative time the system spends in each of the four
corners of S4.
2.3 Dynamics along edges
In order to analyze the dynamics along the edges of S4, using Eq. (2) or Eq. (3) yields the
payoffs in a population that consists of only two strategic types. For example, if the population
consists of X cooperators and Y = M   X defectors, then the average payoffs to cooperators
PXY and defectors PYX are given by:
PXY =
N 1 X
k=0
H(X   1;k;M   X;N   1   k;0;0;0;0)

k + 1
N
r   1

c
=
rc
N

1 +
X   1
M   1
(N   1)

  c
PYX =
N 1 X
k=0
H(X;k;M   1   X;N   1   k;0;0;0;0)

k
N
rc

=
rc
N
X
M   1
(N   1):
Note that for the calculation of the payoff to cooperators, there are only X   1 cooperators left
in the reservoir when sampling its N   1 co-players and the reservoir size is M   1. Similarly,
the payoffs Pij of strategic type i competing against type j can be derived for all other possible
9pairings:
PXW = PWX = (r   1)c
PZX = PZY = PZW = 
PXZ = PWZ = (r   1)c  
  Z
N 1

 M 1
N 1
((r   1)c   )
PY Z =
  Z
N 1

 M 1
N 1

PY W =
W
M   1
(N   1)
rc
N
  

PWY =
rc
N

1 +
W   1
M   1
(N   1)

  c  
M   W
M   1
(N   1)
The above payoffs together with the selection strength s determine the transition probability
that the number of individuals mi of type i increases by one, T
+
ij , or decreases by one, T
 
ij , (and
the corresponding change in the count mj = M   mi of type j individuals):
T
+
ij =
mi(1   s + sPij)
M(1   s) + s(miPij + (M   mi)Pji)
M   mi
M
(4a)
T
 
ij =
(M   mi)(1   s + sPji)
M(1   s) + s(miPij + (M   mi)Pji)
mi
M
(4b)
Note that this requires that the overall ﬁtness of all types is always positive (1   s + sPij  0),
which can be ensured by adding a suitable constant to all payoff values or by putting an upper
limit on the selection strength s. The maximal selection strength is given by smax = 1=(1  
minPij) for all strategic types i;j under consideration.
The transition probabilities T
+
ij ;T
 
ij deﬁne a Master equation which describes the time evo-
lution of the state of the system. From the Master equation, the ﬁxation probability ij of a
single mutant strategy of type i in a resident population of type j can be derived (Karlin &
Taylor, 1975, Nowak et al., 2004):
ij =
1
1 +
M 1 X
k=1
k Y
mi=1
T
 
ij
T
+
ij
=
1
1 +
M 1 X
k=1
k Y
mi=1
1   s + sPji
1   s + sPij
(5)
10Finally, the ﬁxation probabilities ij deﬁne the transition probabilities of a Markov process
between the four different homogeneous states of the population. The transition matrix A is
given by:
A=
0
B B B B B B
B
@
1 yx zx wx xy xz xw
yx 1 xy zy wy yz yw
zx zy 1 xz yz wz zw
wx wy wz 1 xw yw zw
1
C C C C C C
C
A
(6)
The stationary distribution is given by the normalized right eigenvector of A to the largest
eigenvalue (which is one because AT is a stochastic matrix). This returns the probability to ﬁnd
the system in one of the four homogeneous states and concludes the analysis of the dynamics
along the edges of S4.
3 Results
The analysis of the dynamics is restricted to the limiting cases of inﬁnite populations (M ! 1)
or rare mutations ( ! 0) but the general dynamics can be explored with simulations such as
provided by the VirtualLabs (Hauert, 2007) or Brandt (2007). Before discussing the effects
of ﬁnite population sizes on cooperation in voluntary public goods games with punishment,
we analyze the effects and efﬁciency of the two mechanisms of volunteering and punishment
separately.
3.1 Volunteering in public goods games
In inﬁnite populations, the dynamics in voluntary public goods interactions without punishment
is characterized by a rock-scissors-paper-type dominance of the three strategic types to cooper-
ate, to defect and to abstain (loners). This cyclic dominance is reﬂected in the heteroclinic cycle
along the boundaries of the simplex S3. For N > 2 the interior of S3 contains a unique ﬁxed
11point Q, which is surrounded by closed periodic orbits (see Fig. 1a and Hauert et al. (2002a) for
a detailed analysis). For our purposes it is important to note that only the homogeneous states Fig. 1
near
here
with all cooperators and all defectors are hyperbolic saddle points but the loner’s corner ez is
not and is neutrally stable to ﬁrst order. The intuitive reason is that a single cooperator does
not affect the payoffs in the population (nor does a single defector) because this cooperator will
never ﬁnd an interaction partner. It takes at least two cooperators to invade the loner population.
As a consequence, the motion along the trajectory slows down in the vicinity of ez, which can
be easily veriﬁed (Brandt, 2007, Hauert, 2007).
In ﬁnite populations it seems natural to assume that the system is most likely found in a state
with all loners. Interestingly, however, this is not the case (see Fig. 1b, c). Instead, in the limit
of rare mutations, the system spends signiﬁcantly less time in the defector corner and similar
times in the cooperator and loner corners. Intuitively this can be understood by noting that the
average population payoff is at its maximum if everybody cooperates and at its minimum if
everybody defects. The ﬁtness difference between a mutant defector and a resident cooperator
tends to be much smaller than the ﬁtness difference between a mutant loner and a resident
defector. Hence, the mutant defector is more likely to be eliminated by random drift than the
mutant loner and consequentially the system spends more time in the cooperator state than in
the defector state. Under weak selection, the population may even cooperate most of the time.
Simulations conﬁrm this result even for higher mutation rates.
3.2 Punishment in public goods games
In inﬁnite populations, punishment in compulsory public goods interactions (in the absence
of loners) produces a bi-stable situation: depending on the initial conﬁguration, the system
either evolves to an asocial state where everybody defects or into a state where cooperation is
enforced by punishment (see Fig. 2a). Along the boundary of the simplex S3 the bi-stability Fig. 2
near
here
is reﬂected by an unstable ﬁxed point P on the edge between punishers and defectors. The
12edge between cooperators and punishers consists of ﬁxed points and those with w > wc =
(N   r)=(N(N   1)) are stable Nash equilibria.
Inthiscase, changesthatariseduetostochasticityinﬁnitepopulationsareequallysurprising
(see Fig. 2b, c). In the limit of rare mutations (Fig. 2c), the system spends most of the time in
states where everybody defects. Only for very weak selection or efﬁcient punishment (  ),
punishers manage to enforce cooperation. This outcome changes when increasing the mutation
rate (Fig. 2b). For mutation rates of the order of 1=M, punishers prevail. The intuitive reason
for these differences is the slow drift dynamics along the neutral cooperator-punisher-edge.
This leaves ample time for defectors to appear through mutation. As long as w > wc, mutant
defectors actually promote punishment and push the system closer towards the punisher state.
Thus, punishment can be stable provided that the punishers are challenged sufﬁciently often.
3.3 Volunteering and punishment in public goods games
In inﬁnite populations, the combined effects of voluntary participation and punishment oppor-
tunities in public goods interactions lead to different conclusions based on different modeling
techniques. Fowler (2005) reports that loners pave the way for punishers to establish coopera-
tion, whereas Brandt et al. (2006) demonstrate that bi-stable situations arise, in which the initial
conﬁguration determines whether the evolutionary end state corresponds to endless cycles of
cooperators, defectors and loners or whether a neutral mixture of cooperators and punishers
evolves (everybody cooperates, no punishment). Moreover, the dynamics is structurally unsta-
ble, because neither the periodic orbits nor the ﬁxed points are isolated. These differences arise
because the former approach favors punishers in a twofold way. First, a single punisher (or co-
operator), being the only participant in the public goods game, can proﬁt from the public good
instead of being reduced to the loner’s payoff and second, punishers punish cooperators even
if there were no defectors in the interaction group. It seems that the latter approach presents a
more convincing analysis.
13Interestingly, however, ﬁnite population sizes change the odds in favor of punishers. In the
limit of rare mutations, the system spends most of the time in the homogeneous state with all
punishers (see Fig. 3). This effect becomes more pronounced for larger population sizes such Fig. 3
near
here
that for M = 1000 the system typically spends > 80% of the time in the punisher state. These
results are supported by simulation data for small mutation rates. Thus, the original intuition
of Fowler (2005) is vindicated in ﬁnite populations. However, in contrast to Fowler (2005),
punishing second order free-riders ( > 0) turns out to have only marginal effects (Hauert
et al., 2007).
In larger populations, the effects of random ﬂuctuations become weaker and deterministic
drift becomes increasingly important (Traulsen et al., 2005). Therefore, strong selection has
much stronger effects in large populations. In tiny populations with M = 10 individuals, strong
selection leads to approximately the same result as ten times weaker selection for M = 100 and
a hundred times weaker selection for M = 1000 (see Fig. 3), which suggests that the relevant
quantity characterizing the evolutionary process is given by sM. This is in agreement with
other results for frequency dependent selection (Traulsen et al., 2006). Similarly, the product
of population size and difference in ﬁtness of two genotypes denotes the relevant evolutionary
parameter in population genetics (Crow & Kimura, 1970).
4 Conclusions
In Nowak (2006b), ﬁve mechanisms have been proposed for the evolution of cooperation: direct
reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984, Lindgren, 1991, Nowak & Sigmund, 1993, Trivers, 1971), indirect
reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998, 2005), kin selection (Grafen, 1985, Hamilton, 1964,
Queller, 1985), group selection (Fletcher & Zwick, 2004, Maynard Smith, 1964, Traulsen &
Nowak, 2006) and graph selection (Hauert, 2001, Nowak & May, 1992, Ohtsuki et al., 2006).
Costly punishment (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995, Fehr & G¨ achter, 2002, Fehr & Rocken-
bach, 2003, Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006, Yamagishi, 1986) can be viewed as a special form
14of direct or indirect reciprocity. If you punish a person who has defected against you, then
direct reciprocity is at work. If you punish a person who has defected against others (Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2004) then indirect reciprocity is used.
Voluntary participation and the opportunity to punish defectors have been identiﬁed as po-
tent mechanisms to promote and stabilize cooperation in public goods interactions in sizeable
groups. The dynamics of model systems that combine both mechanisms have recently been
analyzed for inﬁnite populations (Brandt et al., 2006, Fowler, 2005) as well as in ﬁnite popula-
tions (Hauert et al., 2007). This approach does not require group selection (Boyd et al., 2003)
or spatial structure (Brandt et al., 2003, Nakamaru & Iwasa, 2006) to establish cooperation and
punishment. In agreement with earlier results (Imhof et al., 2005, Nowak et al., 2004, Traulsen
et al., 2005), the stochastic components of the dynamics in ﬁnite populations produces qualita-
tively different results and requires to modify intuitions, which are based on inﬁnite dynamics.
In voluntary public goods interactions, i.e. in the absence of punishers, mutation and se-
lection in ﬁnite populations supports cooperation such that the system spends most of the time
either in the state with all cooperators or all loners. This contrasts with expectations from in-
ﬁnite populations where loners should dominate because the dynamics slows down near the
loner’s corner. Instead, in the limit of rare mutations, the systems spends roughly 40% of the
time in the cooperator state as compared to 50% in the loner state and only 10% in states with all
defectors. Conversely, in compulsory public goods games with punishment, i.e. in the absence
of loners, ﬁnite populations tend to reduce cooperation such that the system spends little time
in the cooperator or punisher states but most of the time in the state with all defectors (typi-
cally more than 80%). Only if ﬁnes are very high or punishment very cheap, punishers can rule
the world. In that case, individuals will do whatever it takes to avoid punishment and just as
Boyd & Richerson (1992) have put it: punishment can stabilize cooperation - or anything else.
However, this does not explain the evolution of punishment behavior itself.
The dynamics changes considerably when considering the joint effects of voluntary partic-
15ipation and punishment opportunities. In inﬁnite populations this leads to bi-stable dynamics
where the evolutionary outcome depends on the initial conﬁguration. However, in ﬁnite pop-
ulations, volunteering creates an evolutionary pathway for establishing punishment behavior.
The state with all loners acts as a junction where the system switches to the cooperative state
or the punishing state with equal probabilities (Boyd & Mathew, 2007, Hauert et al., 2007).
In both cases, cooperative behavior emerges because whenever the groups of participants are
small, there is some probability that they consist, through sheer chance, mostly of cooperators
or punishers. In each case, the group is highly successful, and will ﬁnd many imitators. The
difference is that in a population consisting of mostly cooperators, defectors will thrive, and
the rock-scissors-paper-cycle will repeat itself. If the population consists mostly of punishers,
it is much more stable, and can only get undermined by the slow process of non-punishing co-
operators invading through random drift. Thus, ﬁnite populations promote the establishment
of punishment. This emphasizes the pivotal role of loners in the evolutionary process. The
possibility to abstain from public enterprises not only prevents economic stalemate by provid-
ing an escape hatch out of states of mutual defection but it also paves the way for establishing
punishment mechanisms that are capable of largely stabilizing cooperation in sizeable groups.
Cooperation (and punishment) is more likely to occur and persist if interactions are voluntary
rather than compulsory.
Acknowledgments
Support from the John Templeton Foundation and the NSF/NIH joint program in mathemati-
cal biology (NIH grant R01GM078986) is gratefully acknowledged. A.T. is supported by the
”Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina” (Grant No. BMBF-LPD 9901/8134). K.S.
and H.B. are supported by I-104-G15 (EUROCORES TECT). The Program for Evolutionary
Dynamics (PED) at Harvard University is sponsored by Jeffrey Epstein.
16References
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York.
Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211, 1390–
1396.
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. & Richerson, P. (2003). The evolution of altruistic punishment.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 100, 3531–3535.
Boyd, R. & Mathew, S. (2007). A narrow road to cooperation. Science, 316, 1858–1859.
Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. (1988). The evolution of reciprocity in sizeable groups. J. theor.
Biol. 132, 337–356.
Boyd, R.&Richerson, P.J.(1992). Punishmentallowstheevolutionofcooperation(oranything
else) in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology, 13, 171–195.
Brandt, H.(2007). Interactivesimulations, http://homepage.univie.ac.at/hannelore.brandt/publicgoods/.
Brandt, H., Hauert, C. & Sigmund, K. (2003). Cooperation, punishment and reputation in
spatial games. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B, 270, 1099–1104.
Brandt, H., Hauert, C. & Sigmund, K. (2006). Punishing and abstaining for public goods. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 103 (2), 495–497.
Clutton-Brock, T. H. & Parker, G. A. (1995). Punishment in animal societies. Nature, 373,
209–216.
Colman, A. M. (1995). Game Theory and its Applications in the Social and Biological Sciences.
Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford.
Crow, J. F. & Kimura, M. (1970). An Introduction to Population Genetics Theory. Harper and
Row, New York.
17Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Ann. Rev. Psychol. 31, 169–193.
Dugatkin, L. A. (1997). Cooperation among animals: an evolutionary perspective. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. Evol. Hum.
Behav. 25, 63–87.
Fehr, E. & G¨ achter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137–140.
Fehr, E. & Rockenbach, B. (2003). Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism. Nature,
422, 137–140.
Fletcher, J. & Zwick, M. (2004). Strong altruism can evolve in randomly formed groups. J.
theor. Biol. 228, 303–313.
Fowler, J. H. (2005). Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci.
USA, 102 (19), 7047–7049.
Fudenberg, D., Nowak, M. A., Taylor, C. & Imhof, L. A. (2006). Evolutionary game dynamics
in ﬁnite populations with strong selection and weak mutation. Theor. Pop. Biol. 70, 352–363.
Grafen, A. (1985). A geometric view of relatedness. In Oxford Surveys in Evolutionary Biology
vol. 2, pp. 28–89. Oxford University Press Oxford.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour I. J. theor. Biol. 7, 1–16.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248.
Hauert, C. (2001). Fundamental clusters in spatial 2  2 games. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B, 268,
761–769.
Hauert, C. (2007). Virtuallabs: interactive tutorials on evolutionary game theory,
http://www.univie.ac.at/virtuallabs.
18Hauert, C., De Monte, S., Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. (2002a). Replicator dynamics in optional
public goods games. J. theor. Biol, 218, 187–194.
Hauert, C., De Monte, S., Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. (2002b). Volunteering as red queen
mechanism for cooperation in public goods games. Science, 296, 1129–1132.
Hauert, C., Michor, F., Nowak, M. & Doebeli, M. (2006). Synergy and discounting of cooper-
ation in social dilemmas. J. theor. Biol. 239, 195–202.
Hauert, C. & Schuster, H. G. (1997). Effects of increasing the number of players and memory
size in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma: a numerical approach. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B, 264,
513–519.
Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. (2007). Via freedom to
coercion: the emergence of costly punishment. Science, 316, 1905–1907.
Hofbauer, J.&Sigmund, K.(1998). EvolutionaryGamesandPopulationDynamics. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Imhof, L. A., Fudenberg, D. & Nowak, M. A. (2005). Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and
defection. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 102 (31), 10797–10800.
Kagel, J. H. & Roth, A. E., eds (1995). The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
Karlin, S. & Taylor, H. M. (1975). First Course in Stochastic Processes. 2nd edition, Academic
Press, London.
Lindgren, K. (1991). Evolutionary phenomena in simple dynamics. In Artiﬁcial Life II, (Lang-
ton, C. G., Farmer, J. D., Rasmussen, S. & Taylor, C., eds), vol. X, of Proc. of the Santa Fe
Institue Studies in the Sciences of Complexity pp. 295–312. Addison-Wesley Redwood City,
CA.
19Maynard Smith, J. (1964). Group selection and kin selection. Nature, 201 (4942), 1145–1147.
Moran, P. A. P. (1962). The Statistical Processes of Evolutionary Theory. Clarendon, Oxford,
UK.
Nakamaru, M. & Iwasa, Y. (2006). The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the
selﬁsh punisher. J. theor. Biol. 240 (3), 475–488.
Nowak, M. A. (2006a). Evolutionary Dynamics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
Nowak, M. A. (2006b). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science, 314, 1560–1563.
Nowak, M. A. & May, R. M. (1992). Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature, 359,
826–829.
Nowak, M. A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C. & Fudenberg, D. (2004). Emergence of cooperation and
evolutionary stability in ﬁnite populations. Nature, 428, 646–650.
Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. (1993). A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-
for-tat in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Nature, 364, 56–58.
Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring.
Nature, 393, 573–577.
Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. (2004). Evolutionary dynamics of biological games. Science,
303, 793–799.
Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature, 437, 1291–
1298.
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E. & Nowak, M. A. (2006). A simple rule for the evolution
of cooperation on graphs and social networks. Nature, 441, 502–505.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
20Queller, D. C. (1985). Kinship, reciprocity and synergism in the evolution of social behavior.
Nature, 318, 366–367.
Rockenbach, B. & Milinski, M. (2006). Indirect reciprocity resolves the efﬁciency dilemma of
costly punishment. Nature, 444, 718–723.
Sigmund, K., Hauert, C. & Nowak, M. A. (2001). Reward and punishment. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. 98, 10757–10762.
Taylor, C., Fudenberg, D., Sasaki, A. & Nowak, M. A. (2004). Evolutionary game dynamics in
ﬁnite populations. Bull. Math. Biol. 66, 1621–1644.
Taylor, P. & Jonker, L. (1978). Game dynamics and evolutionarily stable strategies. Math. Bio.
Sci. 40, 145–156.
Traulsen, A., Claussen, J. C. & Hauert, C. (2005). Coevolutionary dynamics: from ﬁnite to
inﬁnite populations. Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 238701.
Traulsen, A. & Nowak, M. A. (2006). Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 103 (29), 10952–10955.
Traulsen, A., Nowak, M. A. & Pacheco, J. M. (2006). Stochastic dynamics of invasion and
ﬁxation. Phys. Rev. E, 74, 011909.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46, 35–57.
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. J. Personal. Soc.
Psychol. 51, 110–116.
21Figure legends
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
i
m
e
 
i
n
 
h
o
m
o
g
e
n
e
o
u
s
 
s
t
a
t
e
s
e x e y
e z
Q
e x e y
e z a b
selection strength s
c
Hauert et al. - Figure 1
Figure 1: Voluntary participation in public goods games as a mechanisms to promote coop-
eration in inﬁnite and ﬁnite populations. a Evolutionary dynamics in inﬁnite populations. The
cyclic dominance of the strategies cooperate, defect and loner leads to a heteroclynic cycle
along the boundaries of S3 and an interior ﬁxed point Q that is surrounded by closed periodic
orbits (N > 2). b In ﬁnite populations the population spends most of the time in the cooperator
(28:3%), defector (12:7%) and loner (22:9%) corners, as compared to < 10 3% in states in the
center of S3. The densities are color coded on a logarithmic scale with black indicating low,
red intermediate and yellow high densities. c In the limit of rare mutations the dynamics is re-
stricted to the boundary of S3. The probabilities to ﬁnd the system in homogeneous states with
all cooperators (blue), defectors (red) or loners (yellow) are shown as a function of the selection
strength s. The dashed vertical line indicates the selection strength used in panel b. In the limit
of neutral evolution (s ! 0) the strategic differences disappear and all three states are equally
likely. For s > 0 the system spends the least time in the defector state and signiﬁcantly more
time in the cooperator or loner states. Under weak selection the system even spends most of
its time in the cooperative state. Simulation results of the average fraction of each strategic
type conﬁrm the analysis (colored dots). Parameters: N = 5;r = 3;c = 1; = 1; b M = 100,
mutation rate  = 10 3, s = 0:05; c M = 100,  = 10 3, smax = 0:714.
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Figure 2: Punishment opportunities in public goods games as a mechanism to promote co-
operation in inﬁnite and ﬁnite populations. a In inﬁnite populations the dynamics is bi-stable
and, depending on the initial conﬁguration, the evolutionary end state is either a homogeneous
population with all defectors or a neutral mixture of cooperators and punishers. The size of
the basins of attraction are essentially determined by the location of the ﬁxed point P along
the punisher-defector-edge. b In ﬁnite populations the population spends slightly more time
in the punisher corner (29:7%) than in the defector corner (28:4%) and signiﬁcantly less in the
cooperator corner (11:9%), as compared to < 10 4% in states in the center of S3. The densities
are color coded on a logarithmic scale with black indicating low, red intermediate and yellow
high densities. c In the limit of rare mutations the dynamics is restricted to the boundary of S3.
The probability to ﬁnd the system in homogeneous states with all cooperators (blue), defectors
(red) or punishers (green) is shown as a function of the selection strength s. The analysis is
conﬁrmed by simulation results of the average fraction of each strategic type (colored dots) and
the dashed vertical line indicates the selection strength used in panel b. The population is usu-
ally found in a state with all defectors except for weak selection where punishers manage to get
the upper hand (c.f. panel b). Increasing the efﬁcacy of punishment, i.e. increasing , supports
punishment directly by increasing the time spent in the punisher state as well as indirectly by re-
ducing the maximal selection strength. Parameters: N = 5;r = 3;c = 1; = 0:3; = 1; = 0:1;
b M = 100, mutation rate  = 10 3, s = 0:05; c M = 100,  = 10 3, smax = 0:385.
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M = 1000
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Figure 3: Punishment and abstaining in public goods games in ﬁnite populations. In the limit
of rare mutations, the dynamics is restricted to the boundary of S4. The average fractions of
cooperators (blue), defectors (red), loners (yellow) or punishers (green) are shown as a function
of the selection strength for different population sizes M. Simulations where the ﬁtness is
determined through a single random interaction conﬁrm the results (colored dots). The mutation
rate  is the same for all M and thus effects of mutations increases and deviations become
larger when increasing the population size. The analytical approximations are expected to hold
for  < 1=M2 but the qualitative predictions remain valid for larger mutation rates ( = 1=M in
c). Parameters: N = 5;r = 3;c = 1; = 1; = 0:3; = 1; = 0:1;smax = 0:385; Simulations:
 = 10 3, a sampling times, T > 108, b, c T > 106.
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